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1, INTRODUCTION
Intensional contexts, typical examples of which are complements of attitude
report verbs such as believe and know have long received a special attention
and almost been benchmark phenomena for natural language(NL) semantic theories
since their peculiarities pose problems for any existing semantic theory
(especially serious problems for those based upon logical systems such as
Montague Semantics). This is solely because these phenomena force us to step
into the realm of human minds, which refuse any simple ,application of logical
systems per se. The problems that have received serious attentions and many
linguists and philosophers have been struggling for, are basically of the
following kinds:
Failure of Substitutivity of Extensional Equivalents
(1) John believes that the Morning Star is the Morning Star.
The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
(Hence,) 
	
John believes that the Morning Star is the Evening Star.
Failure of Substitutivity of Intensional Equivalents
(2) a. John believes that Kupe landed in New Zealand.
b. John believes that Kupe landed in Aoteraora.
(3) a. John believes that 2 + 2 = 4.
b. John believes that square-root(144) = 12.
(4) a. John believes that p.
b. John believes that p & (q or -q).
These examples show that intensional contexts refuse not only extensional
analyses of meaning, where the interpretation of terms are determined only
with respect to the real world, but also intensional analyses such as Montague
Semantics: the complement sentences in (2-4) are intensionally same but still
shows sharp differences of meaning. Many attempts have been made to solve
this problem, which apparently shows inapplicability of logical analyses to NL
semantics. For example, Lewis-Cresswell analysis called structured meaning,
which counts as meaning of an expression not only intensions but its syntactic
structure, avoided such illegal substitutions as (4) but left (2) unsolved
(see Bauerle and Cresswell[5] and Lewis[12]). These problems, from the other
side of the tradition of NL semantics, psychologically oriented school of
semantics generically called cognitive semantics, constituted a main reason
against logical approaches in general (see Jackendoff[8] for details). But
this is not true. If a logical system flexible enough to incorporate human
minds is devised, these problems on intensional matters solve quite naturally.
This paper provides such a system based on a first order modal system.
The key feature of the analysis presented here is to inject agents' (in
other words perceivers') view into a logical system. For example, in (1-4)
once we succeed in incorporating John's view (John's cognitive state) into our
semantics, it comes to be possible for us to maintain that New Zealand and
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Aoteraora can refer to quite different objects, that p and p & (q or -q) are
different propositions, and so on. Theoretically this view is captured by
possible worlds: in each possible world compatible with one's beliefs and
knowledge, the same propositions or terms receive quite different interpreta-
tions. But such an analysis, as even a short reflection reveals, runs into
trouble when facing knowledge or belief that many people have in common:
states where more than one persons share information. This has traditionally
been called common knowledge (shared or mutual knowledge), which constitutes
the other main topic of this paper.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we will introduce the
reader to the indexing procedure which brings agents' view into our system and
shows that this procedure makes it possible to solve the above mentioned or
other problems of intensional contexts. An extension of this analysis to the
cases of common knowledge will be the main topic of section 3. We will pro-
vide a solution to the notorious Hob-Nob problem due to Geach[7] and offer a
formal analysis to the meaning of definite description. A comparison with
existing theories of common knowledge will also be made in this section. In
section 4, we will explicate a formal model that makes possible the analysis
proposed here. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. INDEXING PROCEDURE
In this section, we will survey the so-called indexing procedure developed in
Akama and Ohnishi[2], Jiang[9] and Ohnishi & AkaTa[15], which is an applica-
tion of modal logic to knowledge representation. Through examining Jiang's
proposal, we will see our problems of intensional contexts disappears, and,
at the same time, more recalcitrant facts arises that are left open for fur-
ther consideration: common knowledge.
Jiang[9] centers around the topic of epistemic logic programming in the
field of AI, where the representation of belief is the main concern. Though
he passed unnoticed the impact of his proposal to NL semantics, it goes quite
a long way to solve previously unsolved problems concerning intensional con-
texts. His over all strategy is summarized as the following principles:
a. The varying domain across possible worlds accessible
for an agent
b. no assumption of rigid designators (two same terms
need not have the same denotation across possible
worlds.)
c. multi-leveled intensionality
d. predicates/ function terms are flexible depending on
the agent involved
The above principles of his proposal make interpretations of terms and predi-
cates totally dependent on each possible world, which is construed as one's
belief or knowledge world. It is quite plausible for the one and the same
term to be interpreted differently (i.e., assigned a different semantic value)
1. In Akama and Ohnishi[2] we claimed that the modal system S5, which in-
cludes negative introspection, is too strong for a system of knowledge, and
proposed a detuned version of S5 (i.e., S5 with negation as failure) as a
viable alternative, which serves as the basis of the analysis in section 3.
For the detailed explanations of S5 and negation as failure, see the paper and
the reference cited there.
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according to the agents involved. For Londoners the term London denotes a big
city in an island of Europe, but for some people this term simply might be
nonsensical with no proper semantic value (individual) assigned. This inde-
terminacy of interpretation is not confined to terms. Predicates also receive
different interpretations depending on the agents involved. Each people has
his own interpretation of terms and predicates. With combining interpreta-
tions with worlds, his proposal enables us to incorporate an agent's view into
the system of modal logic.
In his system expressions in sentences containing attitude report verbs
(i.e., believe, know and so on) are assigned indices according to which possi-
ble worlq they are interpreted (i.e., who is responsible for the given expres-
sions). 4	 See the following formula taken from Jiang[9]:
(8)	 B(Simon, B(Tom, L(Venus t , Marss)))
This formula is for Simon believes that Tom believes that Venus likes Mars,
where the concept Mars is in Simon's mind and that of Venus in Tom's mind from
Simon's view. Note that in his analysis predicates (e.g., like), and func-
tional terms (e.g., Father(John)) are also indexed. It seems plausible for
the interpretations of them to vary across possible worlds, since like in
Simon's mind naturally differs from that in Tom's.
Now we apply his indexing procedure to treat aforementioned problem of
the failure of substitutivity of intensional equivalents. Consider the sen-
tence (3) reproduced as (9) below:
(9)a. John believes that 2 + 2 = 4.
b. John believes that square-root(144) = 12
Obviously John has different beliefs in (9a-b). But they have been formally
indistinguishable: they share the same intension. Bauerle and Cresswell[5]
argue that meaning is not equal to intension but rather to intension and a
syntactical make up (this is called structured meaning) following Lewis[12].
But still their analysis, as they admit, left unsolved such sentences as
below, where two sentences differ only in their coreferring terms.
(10)a. John believes that Kupe landed in New Zealand.
b. John believes that Kupe landed in Aoteraora.
New Zealand and Aoteraora are not distinguishable for they have the same
intension, that is, 'if we consider an essential function of a name is denot-
ing'. Furthermore, in this case the two sentences share the syntactic struc-
ture. We can use here the indexing technique of Jiang quite effectively; the
following will be the indexed representation of (11a-b):
(11)a. B(John, landed-in(Kupe, New Zealandj)
b. B(John, landed-in(Kupe, Aoteraoraj)
Note that here New Zealand and Aoteraora are clearly distinguished (they may
be different in John's mind), hence generally they are not interchangeable.
2. The notation of indexing is slightly different from Jiang's original one
only for the reason of clarity. 	 Terms and predicates are indexed by the
agent's name who is responsible for the interpretation.
	 Those with indices
are construed as speakers' description.
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As for (4) consider:
(12)a. John believes that Susie is a spy.
b. John believes that Susie is a spy and Tom is 7 years
old or Tom is not.
Since (12a-b) are logically equivalent, previous approaches (except structured
meaning) can not distinguish these two sentences. From John believes Susie is
a spy, these approaches inevitably conclude John also believes Susie is a spy
and Tom is 7 years old or Tom is not, even if John actually does not know who
Tom is. With our indexing procedure we can avoid such undesirable conse-
quence: if John does not know Tom any suitable individual is not assigned to
Tom, hence the second sentence receives the truth value undefined.
Precisely in the same way, several puzzles called Kripke's Puzzle in
Kripke[10] falls within this analysis. First of these is a story of Pierre; a
Parisian Pierre had a belief that Londres is not pretty. Afterwards he moved
to London and came to have another belief that London is pretty, not knowing
that Londres denotes the same city as London. How can we describe this situa-
tion? The two beliefs about the same city is completely coherent in Pierre's
mind (since in his mind, Londres and London refer to two distinct cities, his
two beliefs do not contradict each other), and at the same time they are, of
course, externally incoherent. If names are assumed to be rigid designators,
this problem is insurmountable: since London and Londres denote the same
entity, if Pierre has two externally incoherent beliefs, his beliefs should be
incoherent also internally (in his mind). But once we give up the assumption,
the paradox naturally resolves. The following set of sentences a represents
external incoherence of Pierre's beliefs, and b internal coherence:3
(13)a. B(Pierre, -iPretty(Londres))
B(Pierre, Pretty(London)
b. B(Pierre, -1Pretty(Londresn))
BRierre, Pretty(Londonpl)
His second puzzle, though a little more complicated, is similar to the
first in essence; Peter, not knowing that a famous pianist Paderewski and
Polish statesman Paderewski are one and the same person, came to have the
following two beliefs:
(14)a. Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.
b. Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent.
This situation seems to arise when: on one occasion Peter, who is skeptical of
the musical talent of politicians, learned the name Paderewski as a name of a
famous pianist, and later on another occasion got to know Polish politician
Paderewski. In such cases, he will naturally be led to have the above exter-
nally contradictory beliefs (though, of course, internally these two beliefs
are coherent as above). The point that differs from the first puzzle and
hence makes it more difficult, is only that two homonyms are receiving differ-
ent interpretations. Hence if we distinguish two Paderewskis (e.g., Paderew-
ski * and Paderewski **), this puzzle collapses into the first: in Peter's
beliefs these two names have each own	 reference, Paderewski *,- and
Paderewski ** and in reality Paderewski * and Paderewski ** refers to th' sameP'
3. For another solution of this problem proposed in the framework of Situa-
tion Semantics, see Barwise and Perry[4].
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person.
As above, examples beyond the reach of Montague semantics can be re-
solved by using the indexing procedure. There is a further advantage in this
method: we can formalize intensional concepts in first-order logic without
relying on higher-order mechanism such as intensional logic. See Akama[1] for
the aspects of Montague semantics.
3. COMMON KNOWLEDGE
3.1. The Representation of Common Knowl edge and Hob-Nob Problem
As discussed in the previous section, the indexing procedure has provided a
useful device for knowledge representation. The striking point of this proce-
dure is that we can bring people's specific view of the world into a logical
system: each agent has its own view of the expressions in question.
But there are a set of data which can not be treated so easily. We here
consider the well-known example of Geach[7] and discuss that Jiang's analysis
cannot cover this example. His inability to solve this particular problem
leads us to the general problem of the so-called common knowledge.
(15) Hob believes that a witch has killed Cob's cow
and Nob believes that she has blighted Bob's mare.
Now the situation is that we have to guarantee that the speaker does not
believe that there exists a witch, and, at the same time, Hob and Nob have
beliefs about the very same witch. As is clear from this, if we are to give
this sentence a logical representation, we have to fulfill two contradictory
requirements: one is that the existential quantifier has to take a wide scope
so that it may bind both a witch and she, since both words refer to the same
instance of witch. The other is that we have to keep the scope of the quanti-
fier narrow, since the speaker does not believe in its existence in the actual
world. Clearly Jiang's indexing procedure, as it is, does not provide a
suitable basis for the analysis of this example:
(16) Hob believes that witch(xh ) has killed Cob's
cow and Nob believes that xn
 has blighted Bob's mare
In (16), Hob has a witch in his mind and Nob also has one. But the analysis
stops here, since we have no way to guarantee that Hob and Nob have their
beliefs about the same individual.
The next simple sentence reveals that his inability to treat this sen-
tence stems from general problem of representing common knowledge.
(17) John and Mary know that Nancy is kind.
In the reading where John and Mary both have the same object in their minds
Jiang's analysis simply fails, since if we decompose the sentence into two
sentences below, we have no way to guarantee that they share the same knowl-
edge about the same person.
(18) John knows that Nancyj is kind.
and
Mary knows that Nancym is kind.
The difficulty lies in the fact that while his analysis provides solipsistic
view of the world (i.e., interpretations of terms and predicates differ de-
pending on agents involved), what is necessary to solve the problem here is to
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provide their common view of the world.
In Akama & Ohnishi[2] we developed the concatenation technique, which
allows us to concatenate agents when they share knowledge. The representa-
tion for the above sentence will be, roughly, as follows:
(19) John and Mary know that Nancy<i,m> is kind.
where the series of letters j,m within the angled bracket depicts the concate-
nated agents. Intuitively, Nancy with concatenated agents <j,m> denotes Nancy
from the common viewpoint of John and Mary: John and Mary share the knowledge
about the same object denoted by Nancy.
Now it should be clear how we can treat the above Hob-Nob problem. Since
the only remaining problem is how we can guarantee that Hob and Nob have
beliefs about the same entity (i.e. the denotation of witch), the following
representation satisfies our requirements:.
(20) ax <h in› [Hob believes that witch(x <h n> ) has killed
Cob's cow and Nob believes that x <h ;1> has blighted
Bob's mare]	 '-
where the variable x<h,n> ranges over objects in the shared view of Hob and
Nob. We omit indices on the other expressions irrelevant to this topic. As
is clear, this representation guarantees, as required, (1) Hob and Nob has the
same witch in their beliefs since the variable x<h,n> ranges only over the
shared view of Hob and Nob (2) the speaker does not have to be responsible for
the existence of the witch since the variable x<h n> is assigned its value not
in the real but in the shared belief world. 	
,
Of course, the problem of common view is not restricted to this particu-
lar problem. The most typical cases are what has been called common knowl-
edge. We can easily find various situations where we utilize this type of
knowledge, since we always need a basis of communication with others. To get
a feel of how we utilize such knowledge, imagine a perceptional situation
(which provides a most typical example of common knowledge), in which Ken and
John are seeing a teenager smoking. If Ken says to Tom, "That should not
happen again." we understand that Ken is making an assertion based on the fact
(i.e., that referred to by the pragmatic anaphor that) shared with Tom. More
complicated example of this kind can be found in Parikh[16]; when we dance, we
are (at least pretend to be) sure that we share knowledge with our partners,
say, which direction to go, or which foot to step first. 	 For interesting
cases of common knowledge, see Lewis[11].
In 3.2, we will discuss how our analysis of concatenated agents can solve
a well-known problem concerning common knowledge.
3.2. Definite Descriptions and Other Approaches
We next consider another example, which, without reference to common knowl-
edge, could not be fully analyzed: definite descriptions. In the course of
the discussion, we explicate our system in more explicit terms in relation to
existing analyses.
According to Clark & Marshall[6], for a definite description to be used
felicitously, its use must be based upon the fact that all the participants of
a discourse share the knowledge of its referent: they must attain common
knowledge. This means that not only must the speaker know the referent of a
definite description, but also he must be sure that the hearer knows it, too.
Consider the following dialogue:
(21) Ann: I met the man yesterday.
239
Bob: What happened then?
Suppose Ann is referring to Ken with the definite description the man. In
this case the felicitous use of the man, of course, requires Ann to know that
the referent of the man is Ken:
(22) Ann knows that p. (where p is the proposition that
the referent of the man is Ken)
Since here Ann is expecting the hearer Bob to grasp the referent of the man,
the following condition is also necessary.
(23) Ann knows that Bob knows that p.
But these two conditions turn out to be not enough to guarantee the felicitous
use of definite descriptions: we can imagine the cases where these two
conditions are fulfilled but still the use of a definite description is infe-
licitous. Consider the following example from Clark & Marshal1[6]:
On Wednesday morning Ann and Bob read the early edition of the newspaper, and
they discuss the fact that it says that A Day at the Races is showing that
night at the Roxy. When the late edition arrives, Bob reads the movie sec-
tion, notes that the film has been corrected to Monkey Business, and circles
it with his red pen. Later, Ann picks up the late edition, notes the correc-
tion and recognizes Bob's circle around it. She also realizes that Bob has no
way of knowing that she has seen the late edition. Later that day Ann sees
Bob and asks, "Have you ever seen the movie showing at the Roxy tonight?"
As for the definite description the movie(the underlined part), the conditions
(22-23) are satisfied, but still it is highly likely that Bob mistakenly takes
Ann to mean A Day at the Races instead of Monkey Business since Ann is not
sure Bob knows Ann knows that p. That is, the following condition must hold
for the felicitous use:
(24) Ann knows that Bob knows that Ann knows that p.
Clark & Marshall[6], from this and further complicated stories of Marx Broth-
ers films, argue that we need to check the validity of an infinitely long list
of propositions for the felicitous use of definite descriptions: K jp, Kip,
K . K . p K.K.K.p K.K . K . K.p 	
 , where p is a proposition and i, j are the
invo lved
i Jill
means an agent i knows p. This approach to commoni PK
knowledge is what Barwise [3] calls iterate approach, which is in essence
equivalent to fixpoint approach below (with some provisos, see Barwise [3]):
(24) B = A AKi (B) AKj(B)
where B is a fixpoint. Notice that these approaches to common knowledge is
assuming an omniscient observer since we, as human beings, cannot check such
infinitely many propositions. If the use of definite descriptions is based
upon common knowledge, which truly requires such infinite checking procedure,
it is impossible for us to use it, since we have only limited amount of time.
This observation led Clark & Marshall to the third approach: shared-environ-
ment approach. On their account we attain common knowledge without checking
infinitely many propositions, when we are copresent at a situation s such that
s implies A (a proposition) and we are attending to s. Though their approach
seems quite appealing, we get lost when try to formalize their intuition.
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Then what should be done is to create a system in a logically permissible way
which, in ideal cases (e.g, omniscient observer cases and shared-environment
cases), allows us to check of the infinite list of proposition in an instant
and in others blocks it for we sometimes fail to attain common knowledge and
use definite descriptions infelicitously.
Our analysis along this line of reasoning is simply to introduce a new
term E, which denotes every agent in a contextually defined universe of dis-
course. For example, if a discourse is made up of only two persons, E denote
these two persons. But when talking about a rule or convention observed by
all community members, it is construed as denoting all of the members in the
community. The first sentence of the dialogue in (21), which is between two
persons John and Mary, is represented by attaching <E> to the definite de-
scription:
(25) I met the man<E>
 yesterday.
where <E> is equivalent to <j, m>. This representation means that the refer-
ent of the man is in the knowledge shared by John and Mary. Here recall that
we adopted S5 as a system of knowledge, where its negation is taken as nega-
tion as failure. If the system works ideally, it is simply S5, hence, in-
cludes the following modal axiom 4 as its theorem:
(26) Lp -> LLp	 (4)
where L is the necessity operator. In the present context,
(27) K<E> p -> K<E>K<E>p
where p is the proposition that the referent of the man is Ken. Notice that 4
makes it possible to deduce all the proposition required in the first two
approaches, and moreover attain common knowledge without checking infinitely
many propositions. The cases of an omniscient observer and visual situation
cases, which are typical examples of the third approach, seem to proceed in
this way. But ordinary human beings in usual circumstances cannot entertain
this nature of powerful S5, because their information is bounded and negation
must be interpreted as negation as failure rather than classical negation.
Therefore we need to check all the list of infinitely many propositions one by
one to attain actual common knowledge, but since it is impossible to do so, we
must be satisfied, in practice, with only approximate common knowledge. In
this sense the system proposed here rightly reflects (simulates) the situa-
tion we are in.
4. FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS
We semantically formalize the above discussion of common view (e.g., common
knowledge, common belief) based on the system provided by Jiang[9]. Jiang's
model is adopted intact for the rest of the formalization. Before going into
details some introduction to Jiang's model might be in order.
Jiang's model has the following Kripke-like model structure:
(28) M = <W, D, p, F>
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, D i a domain for each possible
world, p i
 the accessibility of an agent j, F the interpretation function.
The key feature of his model is that the nesting of modal operator constitutes
a chain of possible worlds each of which is linked by an agent's accessibili-
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ty. Remember the example (8) reproduced in the following:
(29) B(Simon, B(Tom, L(Venus t , Marss)))
The Venus is interpreted as Venus in Tom's mind from Simon's view: in a world
accessible from Simon's belief world by Tom's accessibility which eventually
comes from the actual world by Simon's accessibility. The indices simply
indicates which possible world in the chain is responsible for the interpreta-
tion of a term/predicate. See Jiang[9] for details.
Our model for common view, while essentially adopt Jiang's strategy,
brings partiality of agents into each world (i.e, domains). It is plausible
that an agent's knowledge does not cover the entire domain of a possible
world, but only a portion of it. The definition of the domain comes to be as
follows:
1.	 siD- a domain associated with each possible worldi,
where the universal domain D = U . D• in particular1'
D is a domain for the actual world. Obviously,0D c
 D
 a domain for an agent a of a possible world i.
3. ID :>• g D i , and Ua {D i<a> } = Di.
4. Domain for concatenate agents
D i<a,b> = D i<a> n especially D i<E>	 fla{Di<a>}Di<b>,
for every a E Agent(a set of agents).
The clause 3 defines that an agent's domain constitutes a portion of an entire
domain of a possible world. The clause 4 is the specification of a domain for
concatenated agents. Since each of concatenated agents are considered to
share entities in its domain, the domain of the new agent <concatenated
agents> is safely considered to be the intersection of the domains of each
member. Especially, the domain of <E> is the intersection of all the agents
involved. A <concatenated agents> acts like an agent and, therefore, has its
own accessibility. It provides a shared view point of its members.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an analysis of intensional contexts and common
knowledge. As far as I know there exists two approaches on this issue, and
these two are deeply rooted to the two main streams of NL semantics. One is
psychological and called cognitive semantics, the other is logical and its
tradition dates back to Montague[13]. The main advantage the former is that
it can easily incorporate personal grasp (view) of the world, and that of the
latter is formal preciseness. Both have their own advantages and disadvan-
tages. Then it must be reasonable to search for the third approach: the one
which expresses human cognition of the world and, at the same time, entertain
logical preciseness. Our analysis are designed to go on this approach.
While entertaining formal preciseness through modal logic, it also reflects
personal grasp of the world through varying domains. With this forml pre-
ciseness our analysis can fully be applied to various systems of AI. .4 And
with its flexibility it realizes partiality of human minds. A fully formal
version of our paper that meets various requirements of logic is now in prepa-
ration.
4. See Akama & Ohnishi[2] and Ohnishi & Akama[15].
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